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Abstract
In an earlier paper I argued that we do not have an objective conception of best interests and that this is a
particular problem because the courts describe that they use an ‘...objective approach or test. That test is
the best interests of the patient’ when choosing for children. I further argued that there was no obvious
way in which we could hope to develop an objective notion of best interests. As well as this, I argued that
a best-interest-based approach was a particular problem around the time of death of some children. A
response from a legal perspective argued that, while there is not a clear conception of objective best
interests, the courts have a well-described approach to ﬁnding a child’s objective best interests. In this
paper, I argue that without clear agreement on an objective conception of best interests, the courts are
unable to locate an objective sense of best interests and that the solutions do not solve the problems that
were identiﬁed in the initial paper ‘Death and best interests’.
In an earlier paper ‘Death and best interests’
1, I argued that
we do not have an objective notion of best interests,
describing this as a serious problem in deciding how
medical decisions should be made for critically ill children.
Among the responses that could be made to my claims is
that the courts are charged with the responsibility of decid-
ing in a child’s best interests and are able to do so, regularly
making ﬁndings of what would be in a child’s objective
best interests. I will consider the legal challenge to my
claims, and am grateful for Bridgeman’s clear criticisms
2
of my paper stating the legal position plainly. Before I
do, I should perhaps have been more explicit (as others
have been) in stating that my aim was a broader critical
analysis of the concept of best interests
3 especially given
my legal example. In my paper, I used an NHS trust v
MB
4 only as an example and as a clear statement of the
law, in order to seek a broad examination of the notion
of best interests. A legal conception of best interests may
be different from a philosophical one, which may explain
some disagreement. But the notion of best interests used
in law should be based on sound principles and subject
to evaluation and criticism. My response addresses two
points. First, I reiterate and argue for my claim that
without a clear objective notion of best interests, the
courts are unable to fulﬁl their stated aim of using an
objective test of best interests. There may be a clear legal
framework, but this is not an objective framework.
Secondly, I argue that Keown’s response to Lord Mustill
fails to demonstrate that patients in Tony Bland’s con-
dition have interests.
An objective test of best interests
Bridgeman and I agree, albeit for different reasons, that ‘...
there is no one objective best interest’.
5 There are two
broad reasons why an individual’s best interests may not
be able to be found. First, there may be no such thing as
objective best interests. In a pluralistic world, there may
be entirely different and incommensurable ways in which
we could live a good life, and the claim that one life is
better than another makes no sense. Even if it is true
that in some circumstances lives may be compared one
with another and one judged better than another, this
may not be true for very different lives in different
domains. For example, an individual may have different
options open to them to pursue a life as an elite sportsman,
a successful businessman or a rural farmer and it may be
difﬁcult to choose between them. This is in part because
of uncertainty over how the different lives will turn out;
however, even if an individual could be assuredly successful
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of those would be (in an objective sense) best, because
they are so very different. It is not possible to evaluate
which is best in important ways. This is an ontological
claim. The other idea is that it may be true that there is
such a thing as an individual’s objective best interests,
but there may be no way that we can ever know what
they are (an epistemological problem). Either way,
Bridgeman and I agree that there is no one objective
best interests.
Bridgeman and I part company in the following para-
graph. My claim was ‘I have not argued that we will not be
able to develop an objective test of best interests, merely
that we have not yet done so, nor does there seem to be
a clear way in which we could work towards developing
an objective concept of best interests’.
6 Bridgeman
responds ‘It is in the next step of his argument, that I dis-
agree with Baines, who then asserts that there is no “clear
framework within which best interests can be assessed”’
(p. 172). While the references offered by him to support
this view do illustrate that there is scope for different
approaches to be adopted to assessment of best interests,
the law has, in recent years, established the principles
and approach to be adopted, establishing a very clear fra-
mework for assessment’.
7 It is important to be clear what
our disagreement is about. I make the claim that we
have no clear way to establish an objective test of best
interests. The complete sentence that Bridgeman partially
quoted is ‘Furthermore, not only do we not have an objec-
tive test of best interests we do not even have a clear fra-
mework within which best interests can be assessed’.
8
Bridgeman disagrees. Our disagreement, then, may take
two routes. First, and more easily, in accepting that there
are no objective best interests, Bridgeman may claim
that the courts have a framework for deciding a legal con-
ception of interests, but then these are not objective best
interests. Remember, Mr Justice Holman declared that
‘My task, difﬁcult enough in itself, is to decide, and only
to decide, where the objective balance of best interests
of M lies’.
9 If so, my claim is that Bridgeman should join
with me in recognizing the limitations of objectivity and
that the claim to objectivity adopted by the courts
should be dropped or modiﬁed. If, as seems evident, objec-
tivity is sought in the legal process, the legal procedures
should be consciously examined and if necessary adapted
to make them more objective or to eliminate as many
threats to objectivity as may be removed, but, importantly,
with the acceptance that these are still not objective best
interests. The second and more interesting disagreement is
if Bridgeman maintains that there are no objective inter-
ests, but that the courts can ﬁnd a child’s objective
interests.
If the claim is that there are no objective best interests
but the court can identify some objectivity in a child’s best
interests, this may be through the use of an objective
process, approach or test so that we can decide on what
we treat as a person’s objective interests. This approach
must be adopted if Bridgeman hopes to retain the claim
to objectivity within best interests, but recognizes that
there is no such thing as objective best interests. And if
we accept this approach, then we must recognize that the
idea of best interests as used in law is merely a constructed
process. But if this approach is taken, it should be made
explicit. Two concerns follow from this. First, although
Bridgeman may claim that the courts have a well-
established way to decide best interests, there is no
general agreement as to what would be in someone’s inter-
ests; either more broadly in society or within philosophy.
Furthermore, there is no agreement on a framework to
assess someone’s interests. So even if the courts have a
way to decide on best interests, as my claim was that
there was no framework to approach objective best inter-
ests, then the legal conception of best interests should be
open to broader scrutiny and criticism to determine
whether the legal conception satisﬁes the criterion of
objectivity. Bridgeman criticizes a medical conception of
best interests as being limited ‘Best interests is not conﬁned
to medical best interests, rather it embraces all welfare
issues including the “medical, emotional, sensory (plea-
sure, pain and suffering) and instinctive (the human
instinct to survive)”’.
10 When considering a child’s best
interests, doctors do so from a medical perspective, but
would strive to give a clear sense of a child’s overall best
interests, not limited solely to ‘medical’ best interests.
The medical perspective may be distorted by the doctors’
interaction with, and knowledge of, a child gained only
in medical situations, but it is not clear why a legal con-
ception, unless subject to close scrutiny, should be pre-
ferred. The doctors and nurses will have interacted with
the child in these sorts of cases over a considerable
period of time. The judge need not have visited the
child at all. And in recognizing that there is no objective
notion of best interests it would be wise to consult broadly
on which factors should be considered in best interests or
what sort of process should be used to determine best inter-
ests. As Bridgeman notes, judges themselves will not be
objective: ‘Critical legal and feminist scholars have
shown that the espoused goal of objectivity is unrealizable,
as judges bring their own values, experiences and perspec-
tives to their judging’.
11
Secondly, it is important to recognize that this
approach to best interests is different from at least some
of the usual workings of the legal system. When a murderer
is convicted, he is convicted because we believe that he is
guilty, not merely because he has undergone an objective
process and that this was as close to the murderer as we
could get. We believe that he is the person who murdered
someone and if it becomes clear for whatever reasons,
perhaps forensic or gene-matching evidence, that he is
not the murderer, then no matter how objective the
approach had been, he would be released. The way that
Bridgeman uses the idea of best interests is very different.
There is no fact or truth that is found by the court. If
the courts are to use the objectivity of the approach, and
not the (missing) objectivity inherent in the idea that
there are objective best interests to ground an objective
notion of best interests, then it is important to make this
explicit and to review the approach or methodology to
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all. It may be important, then, to describe that we have
used an ‘objective approach to alight on what we believe
someone’s interests to be’. This is a mouthful and
perhaps in use it would be shortened to ‘objective best
interests’, but if challenged we should recognize that the
phrase ‘objective best interests’ is shorthand for the
longer and more accurate description.
So how could we go about injecting objectivity into
the way that we ﬁnd a person’s best interests? In some
areas despite a failure to agree on any objective sense of
what is correct or what is best, we are able to achieve
agreement. For example, we have no objective agreement
as to what is best in literature or art, but regardless of
this we are able to have contests where works of art or
books are assessed and one is recognized as the winner.
Perhaps we can look to the way that book or art contests
are judged. In these situations a judging panel will be con-
vened, all of whom will read or study the works of art or
literature and who in the end, although they may have
widely differing views, will be able to agree on a particular
work which may be the winner. There are a collection of
complexities to the way that these situations are judged.
It may perhaps be true that the piece that wins is no one
person’s favourite. My favourite may be as unacceptable
to you as your favourite is to me but we may be able to
achieve a consensus and agree that the one that is your
and my second choice should be the winner as it is
equally acceptable to both of us. These complexities
need not concern us here. All we need to note is that
there are situations in which, despite there being no objec-
tive standard, a clear decision can be made about which
work of art is – objectively, in the sense in which the
decision is made through an objective process – the
best. Will this model work to identify the best interests
of children in an objective fashion?
The answer to this must be ‘no’. First, it seems too
trivial. The decisions that will be made on the basis of a
child’s objective best interests are on a completely different
level to selecting the winner for the Booker or Turner
prize. Secondly, in a book judging competition at least
one approach will be that the panel agrees upon a set of
rules. The rules may be agreed upon in a variety of ways,
and perhaps there will be a scoring system with scores
in different realms – imagination, originality, writing,
plot – all scored and added, or a vote with the majority
winning. However, in determining the best interests of a
child, the judge decides. And it may be that those who dis-
agree with the judgement can see no clear way that the
judge has moved from the facts and the evidence of the
case to judgement of the best interests of a child.
Although the approach used in court requires that a
clear list of beneﬁts and harms is listed for each course,
there is no clear calculus to establish the sum total of
beneﬁts and disbeneﬁts for the child. The process which
may be agreed in judging contests of art may be absent
in the published reports of the court proceedings. Put
another way, those reading a case may follow the reasoning
and clear description of the evidence right up to the point
where the judge decides, where the leap that the judge
makes from fact and argument to judgement is incompre-
hensible. Thirdly, it is important to recognize that panels
are convened for the Booker or Turner prize but, at least
in the lower courts, only one judge is involved. If we
accept that there are no objective best interests and so in
assessing best interests people bring their own prejudices
and particular conceptions of best interests, assessed from
their own particular perspective, it is likely that the
more people, of the appropriate experience or training,
who are involved in coming to a decision the more
likely it is that the group as a whole will have seriously
engaged with the different perspectives. Or the larger the
group, the more likely that group is to make a decision
which ﬁts with the consensus in society. Bridgeman
herself describes the way that judges ‘... bring their own
values, experiences and perspectives to their judging’.
12
This makes it likely that when judging best interests
judges will view best interests from one particular stand-
point; they will have a narrower conception of best inter-
ests than a more broadly selected group would have. And if
we seek objectivity in the process then bias will be less, or
prejudices are more likely to be balanced, when those who
judge best interests have a more diverse origin. Perhaps
here we should note that when medical decisions are
made for critically ill children they will be made by multi-
disciplinary teams which will usually include more than
one representative of several different professional groups
including doctors of different disciplines, nurses and phy-
siotherapists. These professionals with different perspec-
tives will bring a broader conception of interests than a
single judge. Furthermore, they will all have interacted
with the child. Fourthly, consensus is not achieved; there
is a winner and one or more losers. I have described
above the trade-offs that may be made in judging a book
contest, but these negotiations will not take place in a
court.
My claim is that objective best interests do not exist. If
the response is that we have an objective approach to
locate someone’s best interests, to inject the objectivity
into objective best interests, then this should be stated
explicitly. And if this claim is made, we should ask what
an objective process to decide on what we treat as an indi-
vidual’s best interests would be, and having answered that
question we should implement whatever approach it rec-
ommends. I have described above some of the ways in
which the court’s decisions may fall short.
13 In contrast,
Bridgeman denies that there is an objective sense of best
interests but argues that the courts can locate a child’s
best interests. Imagine that Mr Justice Holman and I
have both painted or drawn a picture of a unicorn. If we
both agree that unicorns do not exist, then it does not
make sense to claim that the judge’s drawing of a
unicorn is a more realistic or more objective picture of a
unicorn than my painting of a unicorn. Neither of us
can claim a true picture of a unicorn. They are merely rep-
resentations of something ﬁctitious. And if we are explicit
about this, then, with regard to best interests, it is likely
that we can achieve a better understanding of the child’s
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may be distorted by a particular perspective. Towards the
end of her paper, Bridgeman claims that ‘I argue for a con-
ceptual framework of relational responsibilities in which
decisions about the best interests of the child are informed
by careful consideration of the child as an individual, of
the responsibilities of parents and professionals arising
from the distinct and different relationships they have
with the child and the wider context which informs judg-
ments about the future of critically-ill children such as the
limitations of medical science, discriminatory attitudes and
support available to those who care. Such an approach, I
argue, would ensure a fuller assessment of best interests’.
14
This describes a complete and full assessment of a child’s
interests, although we must be careful to concentrate on
the child’s interests, which must be appropriate. However,
regardless of how thoroughly the child’s interests are
assessed, this is still not an objective notion of best inter-
ests. If there are no objective best interests, redeveloping a
way of assessing them as relational responsibilities will not
instil the objectivity into interests. And, to continue with
my analogy, if there is no such thing as objective best
interests, then everybody’s portraits of unicorns are
ﬁctions.
To demonstrate the confusion that exists, consider Mr
Justice Hedley’s comments, when ruling on further treat-
ment for Charlotte Wyatt ‘the concept of “intolerable to
that child” ... is a valuable guide in the search for best
interests in this kind of case’.
15 There are different
approaches to the way that interests may be grounded;
for example, some people believe that an objective list
may be made of what a person’s interests are. An alterna-
tive conception is that the best way to assess what is in
someone’s interests is what makes her most happy or
least unhappy, or what fulﬁls her desires. These approaches
are well described in the biomedical ethics arena by de
Grazia.
16 de Grazia argues that there is no agreement on
a framework that could be used to assess best interests,
but that the way one sees one’s own life through one’s
own eyes is usually a signiﬁcant component. If this is so,
then an intolerable life must be so far from best interests
as to be entirely unhelpful. Or if it is thought to be
helpful, then a very strong bias towards the preservation
of life has distorted the assessment of the child’s interests
a long way from best interests.
The confusion over interests towards the end of a
child’s life is not just an academic concern. Individuals
in the population have very different views on what
would be in a child’s interests approaching the end of
life. For example, recently a 13-year-old girl decided that
she would refuse a heart transplant needed as a conse-
quence of side-effects of treatment for cancer.
17 Her
parents supported her decision. The health-care team con-
sidered making the child a ward of court to oblige her to
accept a transplant. The views expressed in online
comment sites reﬂect the broad disagreement as to what
would be the best course for the child, ranging from
‘Who in God’s name do the council think they are!!!
This is a very difﬁcult time for the family, they need
support not interference. The stupidity of the council is
of astronomical proportions’. to ‘i am on my third draft
now ... i wish you would try some more Hannah as life
is so important.’.
17 This does not demonstrate that there
is no objective concept of best interests, but indicates
the wide disagreement about what would be in someone’s
interests.
One particular problem with interests in an intimate
family is that of balancing the interests of family
members. There must, as in political philosophy, be some
way in which all the family members’ interests are con-
sidered togetheras it will not be possible to act in each indi-
vidual family member’s best interests. Importantly, it is not
possible to separate the interests of individuals within an
intimate family. Parents have a very strong interest in the
wellbeing of their child. For most parents, that their child
or children should do well is among the most important of
the parents’ interests. The child’s interests are irretrievably
intertwined not only with that of the parents, but also
other family members. That children should predecease
their parents is against some of the parents’ fundamental
or overriding interests. Here the concern is that parents’
interests in their child may lead them to demand that treat-
ment should continue long past the point that there is any
prospect that their child can recover, or long past the time
when a competent adult would have been allowed to
choose palliative treatment. Unpleasant treatment (the
treatment of MB was described as cruel) may persist
without the prospect that the child may survive at the
request or on the demand of the child’s parents.
18 This
must have been among the concerns in An NHS Trust v
MBwherethemedicalteamsupportedachangeofapproach
from aggressive, life-prolonging, treatment to palliative
care, as did the guardian appointed on behalf of the child.
Only the parents’ application supported continuation of
treatment. We must be sure that the parents’ interests in
the child do not override the child’s interests, if we are to
act in the child’s best interests. Or we must be sure that
parents’, or perhaps in other cases the doctors’,
19 insistence
on treatment is at least not too harmful to the child. This is
difﬁcult because the situation that a child should die with
the parents feeling that ‘something else could be done’,
and something could always be done, although that some-
thing may be painful and have a vanishingly small prospect
of success,
20 is a situation that should be avoided. The
parents’ memories of their child may be tarnished with
the thought that things should have been different around
the time of the child’s death. But how far should this
concern be allowed to push treatment in a way that is not
in the child’s interests?
I have thus argued that we have neither a clear con-
ception of best interests, nor an objective approach to
locate best interests. I have concentrated on a critical
analysis of the legal notion of best interests to demonstrate
that the legal conception falls short of objectivity. In this
analysis I have argued that Bridgeman cannot maintain the
two linked claims; ﬁrst, that there are no objective best
interests and, secondly, that the court can determine the
child’s objective best interests, as is their stated aim.
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A second important area of disagreement is where
Bridgeman uses Keown’s response to Lord Mustill’s
unease in considering Tony Bland’s interests, noting ‘We
do not need to rely upon the interests of Anna’s parents
as her remaining interests, nor go so far as John Keown
who, in his commentary on the Tony Bland case, asked
“would it not have been contrary to his interests to use
him as, for example, a sideboard?” to consider that
critically-ill children do have interests’.
21 It is right not
to go as far as Keown. His paragraph in full is:
But could it be beneﬁcial to feed and care for Bland even
though he could not appreciate it? It is, however, perfectly
possible to beneﬁt someone, even if they are unaware of it,
as where A, unbeknown to B, deposits a large amount in
B’s bank account, or speaks well of him to C. And to state,
as did Lord Mustill, that Bland had ‘no best interests of
any kind’ is, with respect surely false. Would it not have
been contrary to his interests to use him as, for example, a
sideboard?
22
Keown (the questioner) assumes that Tony Bland has
interests. What I and Lord Mustill ask is whether Tony
Bland has interests. Keown does not argue for his position,
he begs the question. To assume that he does have interests
side-steps the question of whether he does have interests.
However, Keown’s example is well chosen. The credit of
a large amount of money to Tony Bland’s account would
not have beneﬁted him. He would not have known he
was rich. He could not have chosen to use the money to
pursue some long-held life goal. He could not have
improved his life in his eyes in any way at all. Perhaps a
response is that the money could have improved Tony’s
life in some way; a more comfortable bed or better wheel-
chair and so it is in his interests. But in making this
response we use the word ‘interests’ in a particular way.
There are two senses of the word interests – objective
and subjective. For example, we could say that it is in a
plant’s interests that it receives regular watering and a judi-
cious amount of sun. Or there may be a particular way to
treat a dog that ensures that it grows well, has a wet nose
and a glossy coat. This would be in the dog’s interests.
This notion of interests is what I call objective interests;
this approach is objectively good for something or some-
body. There is a subjective sense of interests. I, as an
autonomous being, can choose my own interests; for
example, I can choose to learn to paint instead of
playing football, and you would be wrong to stop me
regardless of the fact that objectively I am good at
football and lousy at painting and despite the fact that it
would be objectively better for all concerned, me included,
if I stuck to football instead of imposing my art on others.
It is this subjective sense of interests that is important and
which is objected to when the claim ‘you’re being paterna-
listic’ is made and we must recognize that the objective
interests of plants or animals or persons are less important.
It is the ﬁrst, objective sense of interests that is in use when
talking about Tony Bland’s interests. Persons choose what
is in their own interests, but this is not the way in which
we could act in Tony Bland’s interests; it is others choosing
for him. This is the objective sense of interests that has less
moral importance.
To continue with Keown’s other example, I agree with
him in one sense; it would be wrong to use Tony Bland as a
sideboard. But this need not be because it is against his
interests, if he has none, which is what is in dispute here.
In an analogy, I think that there is no sense in which
anyone would claim that Mona Lisa has interests. She, or
it, is not the sort of thing that can have interests.
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to cut Mona Lisa from
her frame and use her as a tablecloth, but it would not be
against Mona Lisa’s interests; she has none. So merely
because it would be wrong to use Mona Lisa as a table
cloth does not mean that it is against Mona Lisa’s interests.
In the same way, although it would be wrong to use Tony
Bland as a sideboard, this can be for reasons other than
that it would be against his interests; that it offends
against dignity, or respect or will offend others, for example.
Conclusions
I have argued that there are particular problems if we claim
to be able to decide on a child’s objective best interests.
Bridgeman responded taking the perspective of a legal aca-
demic. However, legal conceptions of best interests must
be subject to criticism. My arguments demonstrate that
her defence of the courts’ ability to ﬁnd an objective
sense of children’s best interests, while recognizing that
there are no objective best interests, is unsuccessful.
Unless we have a clearer understanding of interests, the
justiﬁcation that we are acting in the objective best inter-
ests of critically ill children when making medical
decisions around the time of their death cannot be sus-
tained. Furthermore, I have demonstrated that Keown’s
argument that Tony Bland, or others like him, have inter-
ests does not succeed.
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